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The family shelter idea is by no means new or unique. Since almost two out of 
three Americans own their own home, a potential exists for providing spaces that 
can protect the American public from the effects of blast. The amount or degree 
of protection is dictated mostly by the economic limitations of the homeowner. 
For this report, three austere shelters have been developed that will provide pro-
tection at the 5 to 10 PSI level. This level of protection was chosen because it 
seemed that the materials that were needed for the shelter construction were read-
ily available and the process of construction was not beyond the capabilities of the 
homeowner and one helper. The three designs consist of a wood-frame lean-to, a 
wood rigid-frame, and a reinforced concrete block shelter. The discussion in this 
report gives detailed information on the design, construction and erection proced-
ures for each of the three designs. 
It is also possible to design a house with the blast shelter and auxiliary spaces as 
integral parts of the design. To be useful to the homeowner, the ''core" area 
must be of minimal size and the auxiliary spaces must be readily usable for the 
everyday activities. To illustrate this principle a series of architectural designs 
are presented in Chapter V. The designs include schemes for the house with 
basement, without basement, split level design, and for a "total concept" rein-
forced house. The designs make maximum use of the inherent qualities of the 
house to provide protection and the shelter areas are integrated into the overall 
concept of the house. Structural designs are not given since these studies are 
presented as architectural examples and not as finished designs. 
Some homeowners may wish to strengthen their entire house to resist the effects 
of nuclear explosions. Chapter VI discusses the necessary steps needed to strength-
en wood frame houses to the 5 PSI level or other levels of resistance. 
The report concludes with a cost analysis of the minimum shelters and a 
Bibliography of thirty-two references. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Almost two out of three Americans own their 
own homes(6). In the $4,000 to $5,000 income 
range, 57% are homeowners. As income rises, 
a greater percentage become homeowners. In 
the $10,000 - $15,000 range, ownership reaches 
the 83 % level. This high percentage of home 
ownership indicates that a great potential exists 
for providing additional protected spaces to 
shelter the American public in the event of 
national disaster. 
The family shelter idea is by no means new 
or unique, but most of the civil defense effort in 
the past few years has been in support of the 
community shelter. It is true that the commu-
nity facility can be better stocked and equipped 
to handle the populace in the event of an emer-
gency. It is also probably true that the popula-
tion might better withstand the hardships of 
shelter life with the company of others to bol-
ster morale and provide services that would be 
impossible in the individual shelter. However, 
in order for the community facility to be useful 
to the individual or the individual family, he or 
his family must be able to reach a facility. 
What the probabilities are that this hypo-
thetical individual and his family will be located 
within reach of a community shelter, and that 
there will be sufficient capacity for him and his 
family, is beyond the scope of this report. The 
fact is, there will be some of the population at 
home, or near home, when the emergency is 
called. And, it is possible, with a minimum 
investment, to provide some degree of protec-
tion from the effects of blast and fallout within 
the home. This sheltered area could be used 
during the period when blast effects are expect-
ed, and then the family could be evacuated to 
community facilities, or, with expanded habita-
bility features, the shelter could be used for the 
duration of the emergency period. 
The amount or degree of blast protection is 
limited mostly by the economic desires of the 
homeowners. For this report, limits have been 
set to provide blast protection at the 5 to 10 PSI 
level. The 5 to 10 PSI level was chosen because 
it seemed that a shelter could be provided that 
could resist these loadings using material read-
ily available to the average homeowner, and the 
process of construction is not beyond the capa-
bilities of the homeowner as well. The shelter 
designs shown in this report were specifically 
developed so that the homeowner and one helper 
can build the shelter, thus keeping the expense 
down to the cost of the materials only. 
This report first discusses the response 
that can be expected from a conventionally-
built frame house to the effects of the loadings 
that will be imposed upon it by a nuclear deto-
nation. This dicussion is a limited one, since 
complete discussions on the effects of blast 
loadings can be found elsewhere in the literature. 
Following this discussion, three proposed 
minimum shelters are presented. These are 
of austere nature and were designed with min-
imum cost and, as a consequence, with minimum 
habitability in mind. The inherent capabilities 
of the house are used where possible to help 
provide the desired level of protection. 
For the homeowner who desires a higher 
level of livability, a series of designs were pre-
pared that utilize a strengthened or hardened 
core as the basic shelter area, with adjacent 
areas of lower protection that can be used as 
extensions of the basic shelter as the level of 
hazard is reduced by time or decontamination. 
Since the strengthened core principle is an 
integral part of the design of the house, these 
shelters are presented as part of a total house 
design rather than as an independent element. 
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The upgraded shelter, as well as its extensions, 
are presented as a package; however, the "buyer" 
may stop at any level of increased protected 
area or increased livability. 
It is also possible that the "buyer" may wish 
to increase the overall resistance of residential 
structures to the effects of nuclear explosions. 
This would require a general strengthening of 
the entire structure. In many instances, ele-
ments of the "conventional" structure have suf-
ficient strength to resist loadings up to 4 PSI. 
In most cases, the connections between the ele-
ments, i.e., roof to wall, wall to floor, floor to 
foundation, are the weakest "links" in the chain, 
and must be revised to increase the strength of 
the total structure. 
It is estimated that the strengthening of homes 
to the 4 PSI level (this would be about a tenfold 
increase over the conventional house) would re-
duce the area of complete destruction from a 
single weapon down to about 4% of what it would 
otherwise be (7). * 
*Numbers in parenthesis refer to entries in References . 
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II. WEAPON EFFECTS ON THE CONVENTIONALLY-BUILT HousE 
The traditional function of the house is to shelter 
its occupants from the environment. In this sec-. 
tion, the capability of the conventional house to 
shelter its occupants from the effects of nuclear 
weapons is discussed, with primary attention 
given to the effects of blast. 
The effects of principal concern are blast, 
thermal radiation, and nuclear radiation. The 
intensity of nuclear weapons effects depends 
upon both the size of the weapon and height of 
the detonation. The individual concerned with 
providing shelter has no control over these 
parameters. Although it is illogical to design 
to resist the effects of a particular weapon 
size detonated at a particular point and height, 
it is possible to provide a consistent level of 
protection against the various effects. This 
objective is appropriate because it is grossly 
wasteful to over-protect against one effect at 
considerable cost while leaving the shelter oc-
cupants vulnerable to the other effects. 
The blast wave is a shock, with pressure 
rising abruptly to a peak value and then decay-
ing more slowly back to normal atmospheric 
pressure. Two additional effects associated 
with the blast may also be of importance. Re-
flection occurs as the shock front strikes an ob-
ject at nearly normal incidence, and high winds 
follow the blast front, which cause wind-type 
forces on objects. The strength of the blast is 
denoted by the peak overpressure in PSI (pounds 
per square inch), in excess of atmospheric pres-
sure, which would be exerted on smooth, level 
ground at the range in question. Figure 1 shows 
the variation in overpressure at different ranges 
for small-, medium-, and large-yield weapons. 
The solid curves indicate the yields for surface 
detonations and the dashed curves indicate the 
yield for detonation at a height that maximizes 
the range to which 5 PSI peak overpressures 
extend. The term "PSI" is not a familiar one 
in the house construction field. To give an 
example, a hurricane wind force of 30 pounds 
per square foot amounts to just .21 PSI. Five 
PSI overpressure acting on a roof exerts a 
force equal to 11 1/2 feet of ponded water. 
The human body can resist very high blast 
pressures, but is likely to be harmed by flying 
debris, crushed beneath~ a collapsed structure, 
or picked up and thrown against a solid element. 
Therefore, major attention should be given to 
the effect of blast on the structure, and to keep-
ing personnel out of the path of flying objects 
and the direct path of the air jets associated 
with the blast. 
The fire hazard arises at a later time 
than the blast hazard, and, beyond the planning 
and preparations required to reduce the fire 
hazard. effective fire protection requires that 
the occupants be protected from the blast effects 
so that they are able to prevent fires from going 
out of control. The range for ignition of resi-
dential housing is essentially the same as the 
range for blast damage. Even then, direct 
ignition will occur only where there are no 
opaque objects in the line of sight between the 
fireball and the building. In many cases, trees, 
terrain features, or other buildings will pro-
vide shielding from direct ignition. As noted 
later, ignition can be limited by good housekeep-
ing procedures, and there is time between the 
passage of the blast wave and the beginning of 
fallout radiation to extinguish small fires. The 
beginning of the fallout radiation is clearly 
indicated by deposit of grit and dust from the 
weapon cloud. 
The major initial effect of blast on a house 
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is to tend to crush it. For an ordinary house, 
the crushing effect is limited because windows 
break as the blast wave hits the house and pres-
sure inside the house builds up almost as rapidly 
as that outside. However, the crushing effect is 
of primary significance for a shelter area, such 
as the basement, from which the blast pressure 
is excluded by strong, tight coverings over all 
openings. 
At a range where the peak overpressure is 
1 PSI, the blast damage to a well-constructed 
conventional house may consist of door and 
window breakage, with some displacement of 
lightly fastened interior partitions and furnish-
ings. Although structural damage is superficial, 
there is a relatively severe hazard to unsheltered 
occupants from flying glass and other debris. 
The blast wave is r eflected when it strikes 
an object, such as a wall of a house. This re-
flection causes a temporary increase in the 
overpressure by a factor of 2.1 for 1 PSI to 2. 5 
for 10 PSI peak overpressures. The reflection 
effect. and the sweep of the blast front over the 
house. lead to a tendency for the house to be 
pushed or translated in the direction away from 
the point of detonation. The winds associated 
with the blast add to this effect. For 10 PSI 
peak overpressure, peak wind or dynamic pres-
sure is 2 PSI. It drops to . 55 PSI at 5 PSI over-
pres sure, and at a lower peak overpressures the 
structural significance of the dynamic pressure 
is slight. 
The house is most sensitive to the horizontal 
forces of the blast--the direct pressures on ex-
terior panels and translational forces that occur 
as the blast wave envelops the house. The tra-
ditional design loads--weight of building. snow. 
furnishings. etc.--are essentially ver ' ical. Ex-
cept in those geographical areas suhjected to 
severe winds or earthquakes, little attention is 
given to horizontal forces in house design. For 
blast loading. the pressure on the windward wall 
exceeds the pressure on the roof, and the peak 
horizontal force can easily exceed the weight 
of the house. The windows and doors are most 
sensitive to blast. As the pressures increase. 
the walls fail where weakened by openings. 
interior partitions are broken, and roofs and 
floor systems are damaged, until total horizon-
tal resistance is overcome and collapse of the 
structure occurs. 
The dimension of these loads can be realized 
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by considering a wall of a house 12 feet high, 
40 feet wide, and 25 feet deep being struck on 
the wide face by the blast wave. At 1 PSI peak 
overpressure, the peak translational force 
would be 145,000 pounds. At 5 PSI, this force 
would equal 830,000 pounds, and. at 10 PSI, the 
peak translational force would be 1. 870,000 
pounds. For comparison purposes. hurricane 
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Figure l 
winds of 100 miles per hoor, with a drag coef-
ficient of 1.0, woold result in translational 
forces of about 12,000 pounds. If the house 
itself weighs approximately 50 pounds per 
square foot of plan area, the total weight would 
be 50,000 pounds. The blast-induced translation-
al forces may exceed the weight of the house by 
a considerable amount. This peak translational 
force falls off very rapidly, and is decreas~d by 
the entrance of the blast wave through windows, 
the decay of reflection on the front face, and 
the build-up of pressure on the back face. The 
translational force will fall from its maximum 
value to essentially zero in a time of about .06 
seconds for the house just considered. Its effect 
is, therefore, more like a blow than a push. For 
below-ground shelters, the whole translational 
loading factor is avoided. 
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When considering means for obtaining blast-
resistance in houses, it ·is important to under-
stand the fundamental causes of weakness. 
Blast is a dynamic force, and its intensity varies 
with time. Toughness or ductility is as impor-
tant as static strength in resisting the effects of 
blast. Brittle material, such as glass or unre-
inforced masonry, is most susceptible to damage. 
Tough materials, such as ductile metals and 
well-connected timber, are able to yield under 
the peak forces and actually can survive peak 
pressures higher than their static resistance. 
Most structural materials have high ductility 
and good inherent blast resistance. 
For the short duration of blast loadings, the 
strength of building materials is greater than 
for conventional long-duration loads by about 
25% for mild steels, 50% for concrete, and 200% 
for timber. 
The major cause of failure under blast con-
ditions in the conventionally-built house is gen-
erally the inadequate interconnection between 
the structural elements. When strengthening 
conventional houses, first attention should be 
given to improving the connections so as to take 
advantage of the inherent strength. The means 
by which lateral pressure acting on an exterior 
wall is transferred to the foundation is shown 
in Figure 2. A two-story house is shown in the 
example, but the concept of the behavior is valid 
for single- or multi-story structures. Pressure 
acting on the wall panel is carried by the beam 
action of the wall and is resisted by the roof 
and floors acting as horizontal deep beams or 
diaphragms. The horizontal diaphragms are 
supported by exterior or interior walls, acting 
as shear walls, which transfer the load to the 
foundation. The direction of the blast wave is 
unpredictable, so all exterior walls must be able 
to act as either slabs spanning between floors or 
as shear walls supporting the floor diaphragms. 
The structural system just outlined has 
substantial inherent resistance when the walls 
and floor panels are conventionally constructed, 
if connections between the elements are adequate. 
Each interface is a zone of potential weakness 
that could waste the reserve strength elsewhere 
in the system. Walls should be connected to 
roofs and to floors to transfer forces normal 
to the wall (these occur when the wall is subjected 
to normal pressure and could be directed either 
inward or outward), and to transfer forces paral-
lel to the wall (these occur when the wall acts as 
a shear wall supporting the floor or roof dia-
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phragm). Walls should be connected to the foot-
ings to resist shear normal to the wall (for norm-
al pressure on the wall), shear in the plane of 
the wall (shear wall action), and vertical forces 
in the plane of the wall (beam action forces of 
the shear wall) that may be either tensile or 
compressive. 
The vertical forces from blast are not the 
principal cause of damage. because convention-
ally constructed houses provide resistance to 
gravity forces. However, the vertical forces 
caused by the blast pressures are very high 
when compared with conventional loads. Design 
or construction defects which would be unimport-
ant under conventional loads may result in pre-
mature failure under blast-loading conditions. 
The resistance of surface panels to normal blast 
pressures is sharply increased a s the spans of 
the panels are reduced, and firm connection or 
continuity over supports can substantially in-
crease the strength by membrane action. Sup-
porting walls or columns should be continuous 
from roof to foundation. Offsets of walls or 
columns are likely to be weak points where the 
shear capacity of the connection is inadequate 
to develop the bearing capacity of the wall or 
column. 
Uplifting loadings can also accompany the 
blast. Although these are usually much smaller 
than the vertical forces acting down on the 
structure, they may cause substantial damage 
unless the structural elements of the house are 
strongly interconnected, It is difficult to predict 
the uplift loadings, so a "rule of thumb" approach 
to the design of hold-down connections is justifi-
able. If a simple detail can be used that will de-
velop the strength of the panel in uplift, such a 
connection should be provided. If a full-strength 
connection is not feasible, an effort should be 
made to provide a connection capable of devel-
oping at least one-half the strength of the panel. 
The provision in the design for uplift forces is 
also of great value for the severe wind loads, 
as well as for the blast loads, 
Blast loadings on structural elements located 
flush with or below the ground surface are re-
duced because dynamic pressures do not occur, 
and the irregular build up of overpressure re-
duces the effect of reflection. The small base-
ment shelters designed in this report are de-
tailed to resist a nonuniform pressure distribu-
tion with peak pressures of 10 PSI. This level 
could be attained at a peak side-on overpressure 
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(Figure 1) of 4 PSI if the blast wave was fully 
reflected onto the shelter. Most often, the 
shelter would not be subjected to a classical 
shock wave, and the shelter would survive at 
ranges where peak side-on overpressures 
approach 10 PSI. These designs assume that 
conventional basement. walls would resist the 
blast loadings. For a small shelter in a blast-
vented basement, pressure would build up in-
side the basement as it built up in the soil out-
side of the wall. Only the small area of wall 
serving as wall to the shelter would be likely 
to have blast-induced external pressure tending 
to drive the wall in without the counteracting 
effect of inside pressure. Since the wall spans 
two ways--between shelter top and floor. and 
between shelter ends, it is unlikely to be the 
weakest link. For shelter designs in which 
blast is kept out of a large below-ground area, 
consideration must be given to horizontal, 
inward-directed pressures on the below-ground 
walls in the order of one-half of the peak side-
on overpressure (2), in addition to the normal 
earth-pressure loading. 
It is also possible to take advantage of the 
strength of the soil in the design of below-
ground shelter. In Table 4.45 of Reference 1, 
buried pipes, either corrugated metal or rein-
forced concrete, have very high blast resistance. 
The pipe tends to be more flexible than the soil 
displaced, so that the load arches around the 
structure and actually is carried by the soil 
rather than the shelter. 
Another effective approach to reducing 
blast damage is to reduce the load by venting 
the interior of the structure. This approach, 
however, requires the acceptance of a consid-
erable amount of damage and results in consid-
erable sacrifice of the structure. In the discus-
sion of fallout radiation protection in a basement 
shelter, it is stated that the protection afforded 
is substantially increased if the roof of the house 
is preserved. A roof that is supported by poles 
or walls with large openings receives much less 
blast loading than one supported by solid walls, 
because the pressure builds up nearly simulta-
neously on both the top and bottom of the roof 
system when the supporting walls have large 
openings. If the above-ground walls are built 
with large areas of opening, or the openings are 
enclosed by weak, brittle materials, such as 
glass or cement asbestos panels, the result 
would be that the roof and floors will be only 
lightly loaded. The above-ground contents of 
the house will be severely damaged by the blast 
wave, but the benefits obtained in the basement 
shelter may justify the sacrifice. 
Fire must also be considered when designing 
the shelter area--both from the direct thermal 
radiation from the fireball, and from the second-
ary effects of blast damage. Approximately one-
third of the energy of the nuclear weapon is 
immediately released as heat. The heat given 
off is sufficient to ignite newspaper, at the ranges 
shown in Figure 1. when atmospheric conditions 
of ten miles visibility are present, and when 
there is an unrestricted line of sight from the 
fireball. The fire hazard is unlikely to exist 
beyond these ranges. Appliances and utilities 
damaged by the blast wave also are likely to 
start fires. 
Fire hazards to personnel include direct 
burns, if they are exposed to thermal radiation 
from the weapon, and exposure to fires ignited 
by the weapon effects. The direct burns are a 
less severe hazard, because any opaque object 
between the person and the fireball will absorb 
the thermal energy and shield him. The emis-
sion of thermal radiation ends before the blast 
wave arrives, so the shield from thermal radi-
ation need not be blast-resistant. The hazard 
from fire started by thermal radiation or blast 
damage is more severe. It should be expected 
that many fires will be started out to the range 
where peak overpressures are 1 PSI. These 
fires. if permitted to burn unattended, may in 
turn ignite fires in nearby buildings until entire 
areas are burning. If the shelter prevents blast 
injury, and structural damage is limited so 
personnel can get out of the shelter, they can 
extinguish many fires while they are still small. 
This is possible since fallout radiation does not 
arrive immediately after the weapon detonation. 
Even if mass fires develop, which requires 
somewhat abnormal circumstances described 
in Ref. (2) and (11), the heat and oxygen deple-
tion will seldom be so severe that people can-
not evacuate the area. 
The last of the major effects to reach the 
shelter occupants will be that of the fallout 
radiation. Fallout radiation does not damage 
the structure, but it provides a severe hazard 
to the occupants. There are two principal 
sources of nuclear radiation--the initial 
radiation directly from the weapon, and the 
fallout radiation emitted by materials that have 
been drawn into the fireball and mushroom cloud 
and fall back to the earth after the explosion. 
It is not possible to describe the total 
radiation exposure as a simple function of 
distance from the weapon. Too many unpredict-
able variables effect the distribution of the fall-
out. Initial radiation is negligible at ranges 
appropriate to overpressures of 10 PSI or less 
for weapon yields of 1 MT or greater. Fallout 
radiation is negligible for weapons detonated 
as air bursts, but can be severe from weapons 
detonated at or near ground surface. Where 
fallout does occur, it first is carried to extreme-
ly high altitudes (sometimes as much as 50 
miles) by updrafts in the mushroom cloud and 
then takes time to fall back to earth. The 
arrival of fallout radiation is visibly apparent, 
since early fallout has the appearance of coarse 
to fine sand. The wind direction and wind 
velocities at different altitudes will affect the 
area distribution of these particles. The high-
est levels of radiation are in those particles 
which fall within a few hours after the explosion, 
so personnel in the open should be on the alert 
to watch for visible signs of early fallout. 
On the basis of data in References (1) and 
(3), for purposes of this report, a fallout pro-
tection factor of 100 is considered to be con-
sistent with blast protection in the range of 1 
to 10 PSI. To provide protection factors of 100, 
special shelter area construction features will 
be needed (12). 
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III. SHELTERS 
The discussion in the previous section stated 
that a shelter providing protection against 
nuclear weapons effects must provide consist-
ent levels of protection against blast, nuclear 
radiation, and fire. It must also remain habitable 
for the necessary period of use, and must be 
readily accessible when needed. It must also 
provide an exit from the shelter, with consider-
ation given to the blast and fire damage of the 
surrounding structure or structures. The re-
quirements for blast and radiation protection 
in the above-ground or below-ground shelter 
are different, while habitability and fire protec-
tion are approximately the same for either type 
of shelter. In either case, the inherent strength 
and protection of the conventional house struc-
ture should be exploited so that shelter can be 
provided at minimum increase in cost. 
It is very difficult to provide the require-
ments for a blast shelter in a large above-ground 
area and still meet the architectural requirements 
for a house to be suitable for normal living con-
ditions (one such example is given later in this 
report). Windows and doors will break at low 
overpressures and allow the blast and the pro-
jectiles created by the blast to enter the house. 
Although the blast-vented house is not in itself 
an adequate shelter, strengthening the basic 
house structure so that it will not collapse under 
the blast load can contribute to the effectiveness 
of a shelter within the house. Considerable 
strengthening is provided by improved connec-
tions between conventional elements, such as 
the floor system to the foundation, the exterior 
walls to the floor, and the roof system to the 
exterior walls. Examples of improved connec-
tions are shown in Chapter VI of this report. 
If the basic house structure remains in place, 
the fire hazard to occupants of the shelter is 
likely to be reduced and radiation shielding is 
improved, because even a racked and leaking 
roof will keep much of the fallout out of the 
structure and away from the shelter. 
Blast and radiation protection in an above-
ground shelter in a conventional house requires 
that a substantial amount of construction be 
built around the shelter area. To provide rad-
iation protection with a factor of 100 in a shelter 
8 '-0" wide by 10 '-0" long by 8 '-0" high, the wall 
construction would necessarily be of reinforced 
concrete 18 inches thick, and the roof thickness 
would be at least 15 inches thick. If a single-
story house of a normal frame construction 
remains in a place around the shelter, the 
required thickness of a shelter roof area can 
be reduced to 12 inches and the walls to 15 
inches. With this thickness of concrete required 
for radiation shielding, blast resistance is easy 
to obtain. Reinforcing mesh of a size adequate 
to control shrinkage and temperature cracking 
(about .25% steel in each face of walls and 
roof) will give the required blast resistance. 
Doweling is required to connect the shelter 
walls to the foundation. 
It is almost as difficult to keep the blast 
out of the basement as it is to keep it out of 
the above-ground parts of the house. The win-
dows in the basement walls are subject to break-
age by low overpressures, and, if windows are 
absent, a substantial problem remains in pro-
viding blast-tight closures for all entrances to 
the basement. This approach appears to be 
extremely expensive, and the use of blast-vented 
basement areas seems to be a better approach. 
The radiation shielding requirements in a 
basement shelter depend substantially upon the 
degree of blast damage to the house above. A 
basement shelter, 8'-0" high, 8 '-0" wide and 
10'-0" long, located in the corner of the base-
ment, requires a 4" concrete roof and 4" con-
crete walls if the house remains in place above 
the shelter, keeping most of the fallout off the 
first floor. The required wall and roof thickness 
will increase to 6" if only the first floor remains 
l 5 
following the blast, and to 9" if the blast leaves 
the basement completely exposed to the fallout. 
If the shelter is located below -ground, adja-
cent to the basement wall, excellent radiation 
protection can be achieved by the shielding 
affect of the surrounding soil. For an 8'-0" wide 
by 8 '-0" high by 10 '-0" long shelter with 2 '-0" 
of earth cover over the roof area, and the smal-
ler dimension facing the adjacent basement wall, 
a protection factor of 100 can be obtained at the 
middle of the shelter using a closure wall be-
tween the basement and the shelter of a thickness 
equivalent to 8" of concrete, even if the base-
ment is fully contaminated. If the exposure to 
the basement is reduced, the protection factor 
would be further increased. 
In addition to providing protection against 
the harmful effects of radiation and blast, the 
shelter must also provide a tolerable environ-
ment for the duration of the stay within the 
shelter. Requirements for food and water supply, 
sanitation, and ventilation are described in Ref-
erences (5) and (13) for fallout shelters. The 
requirements are appropriate for shelters for 
either fallout or blast, because it is the fallout 
that requires a sustained occupancy of the shelter. 
However, the blast shelter has somewhat more 
severe environmental problems associated with 
fire and the hazards from damaged utilities. 
The best method of defense against fire is 
to try to prevent its occurrence by design and 
maintenance. Reference (1) illustrates, with 
actual nuclear test experience, how the mainte-
nance of the house exterior and surrounding 
area can extinguish fire started by the thermal 
radiation pulse. This is done by depriving the 
fires of fuel. The selection of fire-resistant 
materials for drapes, shades, and other suscep-
tible interior furnishings also is desirable. High-
ly flammable supplies, such as paints, gasoline, 
and oil, should be stored in a manner that will 
minimize spillage from blast damage. Utilities 
damaged by the blast can contribute major a-
mounts of fuel. Careful utility layout can also 
minimize the damage from blast. Provision 
must be made within the structure so that 
utilities can be turned off during an alert or 
immediately after the blast. 
Even if the blast damaged house burns, or a 
mass fire occurs, survival in the fire area is 
still possible. As described in Reference (14), 
the direct hazards are excessive temperatures 
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and the presence of smoke and toxic gases. 
Oxygen depletion is not too much of a problem 
since the oxygen concentration required to sus-
tain a fire is greater than that required for 
survival of people. 
The substantial walls and roof required in 
a shelter for radiation shielding provide consid-
erable protection from the high-temperature 
effect of fire. Smoke and toxic gases can be 
minimized by using a hand-cranked blower on 
a ventilation duct with the air intake located 
near the ground surface and at least 10 feet 
from the house or other objects containing a 
large amount of combustible material. The air 
intake should have a hood over it to keep out 
fallout radiation particles. In general, a hood 
which will keep out rain will also keep out fall-
out, and no special filters are required. As a 
last resort. the shelter may be sealed up until 
the fires burn out. The air volume normally 
provided inside shelters is adequate to outlast 
most fires. Furthermore, as soon as the blast 
wave has passed, the occupants may go outside 
and assess the situation from the standpoint of 
fire hazards. 
Blast damage sometimes reduces the fire 
hazard rather than making it more severe. The 
blast may blow out many early ignitions, since 
it arrives later than the thermal pulse. Also 
significant is the possibility that blast may 
blow away portions of the house which contrib-
ute heavily to available combustible materials. 
Where the shelter is in the basement. sacrificing 
some of the above ground portions of the home 
may improve the chances for survival. Once 
a fire has started, it will spread most rapidly 
in buildings which are only slightly damaged by 
blast, that is where the buildings are standing 
but doors and windows are blown out. Buildings 
which are completely demolished by blast may 
be expected to burn slowly or not at all. Al-
though debris from a house severely damaged 
by blast might make exit from the shelter dif-
ficult for occupants threatened by fire, it is 
quite likely that debris will be blown off site 
rather than deposited in the basement. 
Careful attention must also be given to the 
drainage of below-ground shelters. Electric 
sump-pumps are likely to be undependable 
during shelter occupancy. If gravity drainage 
is not available, then a hand-pump should be 
provided, so that the occupants are not driven 
out of the shelter by rising water. 
IV. MINIMUM SHELTERS 
As stated earlier in this report, one of the main 
objectives of this investigation was t o develop 
a family blast shelter that could be constructed 
as inexpensively as possible. The e s sential cri-
teria used for the shelter design are as follows: 
1) The shelter must be able to resist an 
equivalent static load of 10 PSI for short 
periods. 
2) The shelter must provide protection from 
fallout radiation. 
3) The shelter must provide protection from 
the effects of missiles generated by the 
blast wave. 
4) The shelter must be designed so that it 
can remain habitable during the e 
emergency period. 
In order to meet the first criterion, the 
shelter must be able to remain standing without 
failure after the blast wave has passed. Crack-
ing or deflection of the shelter can be tolerated 
as long as complete failure does not occur. To 
provide protection under the second criterion, 
the shelter must have a high mass-thickness to 
provide radiation shielding, and must be located 
so that maximum advantage is taken of the dis-
tance between the radiation field and the shelter. 
If the first two criteria are met, the third 
criterion, protection from missiles, will be 
easily met. The habitability criterion is more 
difficult to meet. Habitability will not be covered 
in depth in this report, since other areas of the 
literature cover habitability adequately(5). 
The first step in this study was to investigate 
those shelter de signs already available through 
the Office of Civil Defense. The underground 
backyard shelter seemed to be the best design 
to provide protection from the effects of blast 
and fallout. However, because of the limitations 
of site conditions, drainage, sanitation, and pos-
sible misuse, the underground backyard shelter 
was eliminated from consideration. The shel-
ter located in the basement of the house was se-
lected as the best type, since it would alleviate 
most of the problems associated with the under-
ground backyard shelter, and the maintenance 
and control of the shelter could be more easily 
achieved. 
The shelters available for family occupancy, 
while providing protection from the effects of 
fallout and debris, were not designed to with-
stand any substantial blast pressures. In order 
to provide a variety of choice of design, and 
flexibility in meeting the various conditions, 
three types of shelters were designed that 
would withstand the effects of blast and fallout 
radiation: 
1) lean-to 
2) rigid frame 
3) reinforced concrete block 
The structural members of the shelter can 
be easily designed to take the high bending and 
shear forces imposed by the blast wave. How-
ever, the connections between the elements of 
the structure are most critical. Because of 
the variations in the direction of the blast load-
ing, properly designed connections to the found-
ation and continuity between the structural parts 
are essential for adequate resistance. 
It should not be assumed that the debris 
from a house demolished by blast will fall into 
basement. It is more likely that the debris will 
be blown off-site. 
Besides providing the required blast resis-
tance and radiation shielding within the shelter, 
the shelter must also be planned and designed 
so that it can be easily constructed by the aver-
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age homeowner. The shelters presented in this 
report have been developed so that they can be 
constructed by two people. using readily avail-
able tools and materials. Lumber and wood 
products are the easiest materials to handle and 
fabricate because of their relatively light weight 
and easy workability. On the other hand, cast-
in-place concrete is a very impractical material 
for the average homeowner to use because of the 
complexity involved in obtaining the correct con-
crete mixes, handling and placing of the concrete, 
the placing of reinforcing steel, and the difficulty 
in getting pre-mixed concrete into existing base-
ments. Concrete block construction can be con-
sidered since only a minimum amount of skill 
is needed to build with block, or the necessary 
labor may be hired. 
For the most part, the designs presented in 
this section make full use of the advantages of 
prefabrication of the units used in the construc-
tion of the shelters, and make use of an expand-
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Space Requirements 
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able module that can be added to the shelter to 
increase the capacity as the needs of the family 
vary. 
The survival of the shelter occupants is the 
main concern of this study, and, therefore, the 
human environmental requirements are very 
important. Each shelter occupant must be fur-
nished with sufficient floor area and volumetric 
space. The duration of the occupancy after the 
attack will be a main factor influencing the 
dimension of the space requirement. The shel-
ters presented in this report are considered as 
minimum, and therefore have been designed 
with austerity as a main consideration. It is 
anticipated that the basement shelter will some-
times be used as a primary emergency area, 
and, after the initial hazards are over, the oc-
cupants may consider moving to community 
shelters or multiple-family shelters with 
higher degrees of habitability and radiation 
protection. However, since the move to the 
community shelter may not be always possible, 
these shelters must also provide minimum re-
quirements for an extended stay within the shelter. 
If the house is not located within the high over-
pressure areas, it probably will still be stand-
ing after the passage of the blast wave, and the 
family or occupants of the shelter could possi-
bly move into the adjoining basement areas for 
short periods of time. However, if the house 
above the shelter is completely destroyed, the 
family is left with only the shelter afi a habitable 
area. In this case, the shelter must function as 
the family's only living quarters until the level 
of radiation has decayed sufficiently or the area 
adjacent to the shelter area can be decontamina-
ted. Since exposure to radiation for short periods 
of time is feasible, the occupants may le~ve the 
shelter for elimination of human waste, for 
limited exercise periods, and for decontamina-
tion of the basement area. 
The shelters presented in this report are 
considered "three-person shelters," allowing 
for either three adults or two adults and two 
children. Figure 3 illustrates the amount of 
floor area and volumetric space that would be 
required by an adult allowing himself to kneel 
or sit with his legs extended in a reasonable 
amount of comfort. This volume, 3 '-0" wide 
x 4'-0" deep x 4'-0" high, provides 48 cubic 
feet per person, which is somewhat under the 
current O.C.D. minimum recommendations of 
6 5 cubic feet. Auxiliary spaces within the 
shelter could provide an additional 17 cubic feet. 
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LEAN-TO SHELTER 
The first of the minimum shelter designs is a 
wood "lean-to" (Figure 4). A lean-to concept 
is not unique, and was shown in Reference (4) as 
one of the early Family Shelter designs. A 
similar but more austere "lean-to" successfully 
survived the effects of a nuclear weapon in a 
nuclear field test. This concept has been rede-
signed and reanalyzed to provide for blast 
resistance in addition to fallout radiation pro-
tection. It is minimal in de sign and readily 
meets the criteria for an austere basement 
family shelter. 
The factors which affect the dimensions of 
the "lean-to" shelter are: 
1) distance from the basement floor to 
bottom of the first-floor joists 
2) the size of the members needed to 
construct the shelter 
3) the space requirements for the 
occupants. 
An 8'-0" basement wall construction, of 
either cast concrete or twelve courses of 
concrete blocks, will yield a clear height of 
7'-9 5/8" when the depth of the basement slab 
is deducted from the height of the wall. A 10'-
0" wood member with ends cut at a 45 degree 
angle results in a short or inside face dimension 
of 8 1-0". The 8 '-0" edge is a convenient 
dimension for facing with sheets of 4 1 -0" x 8 1 -0" 
plywood. The module of the lean"::'to shelter 
becomes a 4 1-0" x 8 1-0" unit (Figure 5). This 
module or unit, set against the wall at a 45 
degree angle, will result in an inside clear 
dimension of 5 1-8". The floor area using 
two modules is 46 square feet, which allows 
15 1/2 square feet per person. The volume of 
the shelter is 134.5 cubic feet, which provides 
45 cubic feet per person. The addition of the 
door, or entrance module, provides additional 
volume. 
The dimensions of this shelter do not allow 
an adult to do much more than sit on the ·floor 
with his legs extended, or sit in a squatting 
position. It will not allow more than a pad or 
cushion for seating, although the 51-8" dimension 
is enough to provide a sufficient amount of leg 
and head room . The additional space provided 
in the toe of the lean-to can be used for stock-
ing supplies or extra sandbags. 
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To take advantage of the structural integrity 
of the materials used for the lean-to, the module 
must be constructed as a continuous unit, and is, 
therefore, designed as a plywood stressed-skin 
panel. By gluing the plywood skin to the stringer 
members. continuity is achieved and the prop-
erties of the stringer section are enhanced. A 
gluing process is needed to achieve this. since 
the glue is more reliable than nailing to achieve 
continuity. A panel using a stressed43kin sys-
tem not only improves the bending and shear 
properties of the panel but also causes the panel 
to act as a diaphragm, which improves the ca-
pacity of the shelter to withstand the lateral 
forces from the side walls of the basement. 
An analysis of the stressed-skin panels 
indicated that 3/ 4-inch plywood skins were 
necessary to resist 10 PSI peak overpressures. 
A static ultimate strength (qy) was found for 
bending. horizontal shear, and rolling shear in 
the section. The actual dynamic load that the 
section can take is influenced by the flexibility 
of the members. The section 1 s period of 
vibration and the time duration of the blast loads 
influence the ratio of peak dynamic load to static 
strength. It is also necessary to consider wheth-
er bending or shear will cause failure. Struc-
tures tending to fail in shear have a lower ratio 
of dynamic resistance to static strength. A 
module design using 3/ 4-inch plywood skins and 
2 x 12 stringers will actually take as much as 
20 PSI in bending, but is limited by the shear 
capacity of the plywood. A properly glued joint 
will actually be stronger than the wood members 
that it joins together. Failure will normally 
occur in the member rather than in the joint. 
Phenolic resin glues or casein glues are strongly 
recommended. 
The critical areas of the lean-to structure are 
the connections between the modules and the floor 
and wall plates, and the connection of the floor 
plate to the floor and the wall plate to the wall. 
Since the shelter will be exposed to both down-
ward forces and upward forces, the connection 
must counteract any possible movement which 
could lead to collapse. During the downward 
pressure phase, there is no great danger of 
movement since the force is acting uniformly 
and normal to the diagonal face of the structure, 
and the load is transmitted directly into the 
basement wall and floor. A major portion of 
the force reaction is transferred directly by 
bearing, causing a wedge actiori. 
3f4" plywood bottom face 
( glue - nailed ) 
Figure 5 
stringer--~ 
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.---sandbag fillers 
3/4" plywood 
( glue - nailed ) 
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As the blast wave enters the basement area, 
the loading on the shelter is not uniform, and 
is somewhat erratic. A reasonably conservative 
approach to the tendency of the structure to ro-
tate because of uneven loading is to place a load 
of 10 PSI on half of the structure and to design 
the connections at the floor and wall to resist 
this loading condition. When the shelter is fully 
loaded at 10 PSI, there will be little, if any, move-
ment at the wall and floor connections due to the 
frictional resistance at these points. The con-
nection must also be designed to resist with-
drawl due to the negative phase. At the magni-
tude of the downward pressure within the design 
limits, corresponding negative and drag pressures 
would be similar to the force of a tornado, or 
approximately 2 PSI. 
The loads imposed by the shelter on the soil 
beneath the basement slab and on the basement 
walls do not present any problems as long as 
the basement wall is completely below grade. 
The critical part of the design is the connection 
- 1V2" helically 
threaded nails 
each side 
3 - 1V2" helically 
threaded nails 
each side 
WALL AND FLOOR CONNECTIONS 
Figure 6 
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to the floor and wall, and the connection of the 
module stringers to the wall and the floor plates. 
A 2 x 12 wood member is used for the bear-
ing plate on both the wall and the floor (Figure 6). 
The floor plate can be secured to the floor slab 
in a number of ways. In new construction, bolts 
can be located in the slab with large plate washers 
below the slab, which will insure distribution of 
the withdrawal force and insure anchorage. In 
the event the lean-to structure is used in existing 
buildings, a hole would have to be drilled in the 
concrete slab so that the bolts could be placed, 
and then the section of concrete that was removed 
replaced with an expandable concrete grout. 
The connection of the wall plate to the wall 
is done in a similar manner, with holes drilled 
completely through the concrete or concrete 
block wall and one 3/ 4-inch bolt provided for 
each stringer load. A 2" x 2" x 1/ 4" bearing 
washer should be provided between the bolt 
head and the basement wall, and non-shrinking 
grout should be used to fill the area between the 
bolt and the bolt hole. The exterior side of the 
basement wall should then be parged and water-
proofed to prevent the entrance of water into the 
basement. By using bolts in this manner, the 
withdrawal force caused by the negative phase 
will be taken in the bolt in tension, transferred 
to the washer, and then transferred to the ex-
terior wall surface in bearing. The lateral loads 
will be transferred in bearing through an area 
equal to the projected area of the hole in the 
wall for the bolt. If concrete block were used 
for the construction of the basement wall, the 
exterior washer should be enlarged to 3 inches 
square, to provide a larger transfer area. 
As an alternate means of .securing the 
wood plate to the floor slab, high-carbon steel 
fluted masonry nails can be used. Using data 
shown in Reference (8), it was determined that 
.250 x 3 1/4-inch heavy-duty masonry nails for 
each stringer would be sufficient to resist the 
loads imposed by the 10 PSI peak overpressures. 
To insure that the wood plate does not pull 
through the nail in withdrawal, a 16-guage sheet-
metal strip and washer should be used between 
the nails and the plate. The nails should be 
driven through pre-drilled holes in the bearing 
plate with a 6-pound hammer. 
Another alternate means of securing the 
plate to the floor slab is by the use of powder-
driven heavy-duty masonry studs. These would 
be particularly useful in existing construction, 
when the concrete is fully cured and the driving 
of masonry nails becomes particularly difficult. 
An analysis of the available studs indicates that 
. 219 x 3 1/4-inch studs can be used if three of 
the studs are placed between each stringer. 
The connection between the module stringers 
and the wall and floor plates completes the con-
tinuity of the lean-to wall and floor. A number 
of connecting devices were investigated, and all 
were rejected because of either impracticality 
or inability to carry the loads. Figure 7 illus-
trates a sheet metal connector that can be fab-
ricated quite simply and will take the loading. 
Although it is conceivable to allow the metal 
connector to yield or deform during the blast 
loading without failure, the strength of the 
connection depends entirely on the fasteners 
through the metal connector. The most practical 
type of fastener to use would be some type of 
nail. It was found that the common wire nail 
will not take the type of loading imposed by the 
blast wave. To resist this type of loading, high-
strength, deformed, high-carbon nails should 
be used. 
The two major types of deformed nails that 
are available are the helically-grooved nail 
and the annularly-grooved nail. Tests shown in 
Reference (8) give a comparison between these 
two types of deformed nails. The helically-
threaded nail is not as strong in withdrawal as 
the annularly-grooved nail, but is stronger in 
resistance to lateral loads. Since the most crit-
cal load on the shelter is the lateral load, the 
helically-threaded nail is recommended. The 
ultimate load capacity of the nail is about 4 or 
5 times the normal value(9). For example, a 
helically-threaded nail .135 x 1 1/2-inch can be 
loaded to 1200 lb/nail in lateral load and 1000 
lb/nail in withdrawal at ultimate load capacity. 
When metal plates are used for connecting 
devices, the ultimate strength can be increased 
by another 25%. This increase is offset by the 
reduction of 25% required when lumber is treat-
ed with fire-retardant chemicals (10). 
An analysis shows that six helically-threaded 
nails would be adequate to take the loads imposed 
on the connection. Two groups of six nails each 
would be required to connect the metal plate to 
the stringer, and to connect the floor or wall 
plate to the metal connector. To assure adequate 
bearing of the nail head and to provide for resis-
tance to punching failure of the nail through the 
s heet metal connector, a washer should be pro-
vided at each nail head. The washer may be of 
steel, lead, flat neoprene, or flat or dished, 
metal-backed, neoprene washers . 
In order to provide a means of closing the 
shelter entrance and adequately protecting the 
occupants from the blast effects, a door unit 
must be provided. Commercially available 
blast doors do not seem practical for this type 
of shelter, since they are either too large or 
too expensive to meet the austere requirements 
of this type of shelter. The door need only be 
large enough for a person to easily enter and 
leave the shelter, and it should be of minimal 
size to reduce the possibility of blast failure. 
The human figure studies mentioned earlier in 
this report indicated that an adult could easily 
crawl through an opening 18" wide and 30" high. 
A door fabricated of 3/4-inch plywood reinforced 
with 2 x 4 members can adequately span this 
type of opening and resist 10 PSI peak pressure 
loadings. However, the door must adequately 
resist both the positive and negative phases of 
the blast wave. 
These alternate methods of designing the 
door were investigated: 
1) A single sheet of plywood fastened to 
the exterior of the door unit so that it 
16- GAUGE SHEET METAL CONNECTOR 
Figure 7 
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can withstand both the negative and 
positive phases. 
2) Two doors, one on the outside of the 
door unit, and one on the inside of the 
door unit, designed so that the outside 
and inside doors take the positive and 
negative phases by bearing against the 
door unit stringers. 
3) One exterior door backed by sandbags. 
The exterior door would withstand the 
positive phase, and probably would be 
torn off by the negative phase, leaving 
the sandbags to provide protection during 
this period. 
In all three, sandbags will be required for 
fallout protection at the door opening, since 
the plywood door lacks the mass needed to 
provide radiation protection. 
The design study indicated that it was im-
practical to install a door in the side wall of 
the shelter. By adding half of a shelter module, 
the fitting of the shelter door can be facilitated, 
and the additional volume created by the half 
module can be added to the environmental re-
quirements of the shelter. The door unit is 
similar in construction to the lean-to unit. The 
2 x 12 stringers are doubled around the opening 
to increase the strength of the unit so that it 
can withstand lateral forces from the side wall. 
To provide additional insurance that the loads 
will transfer from the side wall, a mid-point 
and quarter-point 2 x 12 brace is provided in 
the upper half of the door unit, and is connected 
to the stringers, using the metal connectors 
described earlier. Figure 8 illustrates the 
construction of the door unit. The door described 
in the third alternative becomes most practical, 
even though sandbags are needed to withstand the 
negative phase. The necessary sandbags could 
be stored in the excess space in the door unit 
and should not prove to be inconvenient for the 
occupants to stack behind the door. 
The side or end wall of the lean-to shelter 
is constructed in a manner that is similar to 
the construction of the lean-to wall. The 2 x 12 
stringers are placed vertically in the triangular 
opening, and 3/ 4-inch plywood is applied to both 
sides of the 2 x 12's. Stringers are attached to 
the 2 x 12 floor plate using the same metal con-
nectors used elsewhere in the lean-to. The wood 
floor plate is connected to the concrete floor in 
the same manner as the longitudinal floor plate. 
The tops of the vertical stringers should be at-
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tached to the end diagonal 2 x 12 member of the 
door module. This 2 x 12 should be doubled so 
the lateral impact load can be transmitted to the 
diaphragm of the plywood stressed-skin panels 
evenly. 
The wood materials used in the construction 
of the lean-to shelter can readily be purchased 
at any lumber yard. The wood members should 
be stress-graded (select-structural) and should 
be pressure-treated with a fire -retardant chem-
ical. Prevention of the spread of fire is very 
important to the success of the shelter. During 
the initial thermal radiation effect, exposed 
surfaces can be scorched or cause fires, depend-
ing upon the combustibility of the material. 
Therefore, knots, checks, and other defects 
should be kept to a minimum. The plywood 
should be exterior-grade A-C, and the "A" sur-
face used as the exposed surface of the lean-to. 
This will somewhat minimize the comrustibility 
of the material. The adhesive used to glue the 
members together should be casein, type II or 
phenol-resorcinol. The manufacturer's directions 
Figure 8 
and temperature recommendations should be 
followed very carefully when using these ad-
hesives, or failure of the glue joint can res:ult. 
The helically-threaded nails, the special 
metal connectors, and the special-size sand-
bags will not be readily available to the general 
public. The helically-threaded nails are not 
generally s 1ocked by local lumber and hardware 
stores. The metal connectors, as discussed 
earlier in this report, are a special design and 
would have to be fabricated for each shelter. If 
the connectors could be mass-produced, the 
cost of the connectors could be substantially 
reduced. The sandbags should be manufactured 
with a dimension of 14" x 11 1/2" x 5 3/ 4", 
since these should fit the space between stringers 
and the space between the plywood faces. The 
sandbag, when filled, will weigh approximately 
65 to 70 pounds, and could be handled and placed 
by one or two people. 
It is suggested that the shelter accessories 
can be made up into a kit form, consisting of 
the empty sandbags, metal connectors, and 
special nails, and be made available to the 
general public. These kits could contain all the 
accessories needed to construct the lean-to 
shelter. 
In addition to the common hand tools, such 
as hammers, wrenches, and hand saws, the 
homeowner will also be required to rent or 
borrow tools such as a rotary impact drill for 
making the holes to receive the floor bolts and 
for drilling the holes through the concrete base-
ment walls, and, if powder-actuated fasteners 
are used, this tool will also have to be rented 
or borrowed. 
The erection procedure used to construct the 
lean-to is very simple and straight-forward. 
As much of the unit as possible is prefabricated 
on the floor of the basement before it is lifted 
and fastened in the place against the floor and 
wall. 
The interior face of the stressed-skin panel 
should be nail-glued to the bottom of the stringers, 
and the wall bearing plate should be fastened 
with the metal connectors to one end of the 
stringers. Bolt holes for fastening the module 
to the basement wall should be pre-drilled through 
the basement wall and through the wall bearing 
plate. The unit can then be lifted by two men 
and placed against the basement wall, lining up 
the bolt hole. The bolt is then placed from the 
inside of the base.ment through the wall bearing 
plate and basement wall, and the washer and nut 
placed on the outside of the basement wall. The 
door unit can be fabricated in a similar manner, 
and then the end wall, or side wall, can be fab-
ricated to fit the resulting open space. Once 
the shelter modules and door unit are in place, 
the voids between the module stringers can be 
filled with sandbags and the outer skin nail-
glued to the tops of the stringers, completing 
the shelter. 
In summary, the lean-to basement shelter 
offers a very efficient minimum structure which 
meets the established shelter requirements. 
Additional consideration should be given to 
ventilation, fallout protection, and provisioning 
the shelter. The survival of the shelter occu-
pants may depend more on the availability of fresh 
air, food water, and medical supplies than on com-
plete protection against blast and limited fallout. 
The lean-to shelter provides 57 cubic feet 
of volume per person, which is somewhat below 
the 65 cubic feet per person presently recommend-
ed by the Office of Civil Defense. Additional 
ventilation can be provided for the shelter 
occupants by the removal of the upper sandbags 
in the door unit or by the provision of a hand-
operated blower. The toe of the lean-to shelter 
provides excellent space for the storage of 
provisions such as water containers, food supplies. 
first-aid kits, blankets, radiation meters, battery-
operated radios, and tools. such as crow bars 
for use in leaving the shelter should the building 
above collapse around the shelter area. Additional 
supplies could also be stored near the shelter in 
the adjacent basement area. 
RIGID-FRAME SHELTER 
The second shelter design incorporates the use 
of prefabricated rigid frames for the main 
structural members of the shelter. The rec-
tangular shape increases the habitability features 
over the lean-to shape, although it still does 
not provide clearance for the occupants to stand 
up within the shelter. 
As with the lean-to shelter, the rigid frame 
shelter takes advantage of the economics, light 
weight, and ease of working with wood members. 
The shelter is essentially a sub-structure of 
rigid wood frames, with plywood inner and outer 
skins and sandbags used as filler material. The 
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elements of the shelter are designed as 48-inch 
modules, similar to the lean-to shelter, so that 
standard 4'-0" sheets of plywood can be used 
(see Figure 9a). 
From the space requirements mentioned 
earlier in this report, the minimum rectangular 
shelter needed to accommodate three adults 
could have the dimensions of 4'-0" high by 4'-0" 
deep by 8 '-0" long. This shape would provide 
adequate floor area but would be somewhat 
inadequate in volume. Lengthening the shelter 
to 10'-0" still does not provide enough volume 
within the structure. Increasing the dimensions 
of the shelter to 5'-0-" wide by 4'-0" high by 
10'-0" long provides sufficient volume within 
the structure. The following design was based 
on these dimensions. 
The 4'-0" height dimension results in a 
total height of approximately 5 '-0", which still 
leaves more than 2 '-0" of working space above 
the shelter, even in a shallow basement. This 
space is needed to place the sandbags and to 
complete the attachment of the outer skin to the 
shelter. 
Structurally, the rectangular shelter consists 
of 2 x 12 roof and wall members connected by 
1/2-inch plywood gussets, nail-glued at the joint 
between wall and roof to form a rigid frame. 
The frames are spaced approximately 16 inches 
on center and faced on both sides with 3/ 4-inch 
plywood stressed-skins. Both wall and roof 
elements are designed to withstand 10 PSI peak 
overpressure loadings. The rigid frame design 
results in a large portion of the bending moment 
being concentrated at the joint. The two rectang-
ular plywood gusset plates shown in Figure 9a 
adequately take the loading imposed on the joint. 
The 23-inch dimension of the gusset plate is 
somewhat over-designed, but it insures the 
needed rigidity and eliminates shear failure in 
the plywood by enlarging the glue area. To pro-
vide lateral rigidity between the module units, 
they are joined at the top and side of the rigid 
frame by a strip of plywood that has its grain 
running perpendicular to the frames (see Figure 
10). 
The stressed-skin design allows the modules 
to act as a unit, both in compression and in 
combined bending. Although the skin is subjected 
to a lateral force from the sidewalls, the section 
is stiff enough to resist both lateral torsional 
and buckling effects. Both compression and 
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bending are relatively low, and their combined 
effect will not cause failure. The governing 
stress is still shear, but, as in the lean-to 
structure, using the same cross-sectional design, 
the shelter will withstand 10 PSI loadings with-
out an internal stress failure. 
Also, as in the lean-to design, the most 
critical joint is the connection to the basement 
wall and floor. In the rigid-frame shelter, how-
ever, the lateral force is more significant 
because the direct bearing and wedge action can-
not be depended upon to carry the load. 
The analysis of the blast effect on the rigid-
frame structure is similar to that used for the 
lean-to structure. Since the blast wave is some-
what erratic as it enters the basement, a 10 PSI 
peak overpressure loading was considered 
separately on both the roof and wall elements. 
With the 10 PSI loading on the roof section only, 
the lateral shear force is most critical. To 
resist this shear force, eight 1 1/2-inch helically 
threaded nails are needed to connect the rigid-
frame elements to the wall and floor bearing 
plates through the metal connectors. To anchor 
the wall bearing plate to the wall, one l-inch 
round bolt with a 3 x 12 bearing plate could be 
door 
and 
Figure 9 
RlGlD- fRAME SHELTER 
Figure 10 
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used. To secure the floor bearing plate to the 
basement floor slab, three 3 1/2-inch heavy-
duty masonry nails can be used, or four 3 1/2-
inch powder-driven studs, or l-inch round 
bolts as used at the wall connection (Figure 11). 
The door unit is of similar construction to 
the one used in the lean-to. The roof element is 
a stressed-skin panel made up of rigid frames 
with 3/ 4-inch plywood skins and sandbag fill. 
An opening approximately 3 '-0" high by 1 '-6" 
wide is provided in the wall element. Pieces of 
2 x 12 blocking are used to reduce the span of 
the 3/ 4-inch plywood skins. For the rigid frame 
structure, an inside and outside door can be 
used that will resist both the positive phase of 
the negative phases of the blast wave. The out-
side door is designed to resist the positive phase 
anchor 
plate 
of the blast wave and the inner door the negative 
phase (see Figure 9b). It will be necessary to 
stack sandbags within the shelter to provide the 
necessary mass shielding for radiation protection 
at the door opening. 
The end wall of the shelter is made up of 
2 x 12 vertical members with 3/ 4-inch plywood 
skins and sandbag fillers. The 2 x 12 members 
are connected to the floor bearing plate and to 
the roof section of the door unit frame. The 
sheet metal connectors used elsewhere in the 
shelter are also used at these connections. 
The material and tools needed for the con-
struction of the rigid-frame shelter are similar 
to those used for the lean-to shelter. If at all 
possible, the plywood for the inner and outer 
bolt 
heet metal connector with 
4 helically threaded 
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nails on each side 
24"x11'12" plywood gusset 
sandbag filler 
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SECTION . RIGID- FRAME SHELTER 
Figure ll 
skins should be purchased in 4 1 by 10 1 sheets. 
The use of this size plywood sheet will result 
in the most economical cutting procedure. The 
other shelter accessories, such as the helically-
threaded nails, sheet metal connectors, and sand-
bags are the same as those recommended for 
use in the lean-to shelter. It is again suggested 
that these items be packaged as a kit, since they 
may not be readily accessible to the average 
homeowner. 
The construction and erection of the rigid 
frame shelter follows the same procedure as 
outlined for the lean-to shelter, and as much of 
the shelter as possible should be prefabricated 
before the units are erected against the wall. 
The first stage of construction consists of 
fabricating the rigid frames from the 2 x 12 
wood members. It is important to note that 
there are two types of rigid frames in each 
module. The interior frames have gusset plates 
on both sides of the connection between the roof 
and wall elements, while the end frames have 
gusset plates only on the interior face of the 
frame (see Figure 9a). After the frames are 
fabricated, the interior plywood skins should 
be applied to form the 4-foot module. The wall 
bearing plate and floor bearing plate are anchored 
as discussed in the lean-to shelter. The modules 
are erected as the fabrication takes place, and 
the shelter is completed by the assembly of the 
door unit and the end or side wall. To complete 
the shelter, the sandbags are placed between 
the rigid frames and then the exterior skin is 
nail-glued to the shelter. 
Shelter provisioning and ventilation is 
similar to that of the lean-to shelter. 
REINFORCED CONCRETE BLOCK SHELTER 
The third shelter type is constructed of rein-
forced concrete block walls with a stressed-
skin panel roof. While this shelter type does 
not offer any additional space or amenities over 
the rigid-frame shelter, it is somewhat less 
costly in materials, and, if the homeowner can 
do his own labor, he will have a total cost some-
what below either of the wood shelters. Cast-in 
place concrete was eliminated as a possible rna-
erial for the construction of the shelter because 
of the expense of formwork and labor, and the 
difficulty in handling for the average homeowner. 
However, concrete blocks are relatively light 
in weight, require no formwork, and, with a 
mmimum of instruction, the average homeowner 
can do an adequate job of block laying. In order 
to provide the mass needed to get adequate pro-
tection from radiation, 12-inch block will be 
necessary. It will also be necessary to fill the 
voids of the block with grout or sand. 
The dimensions of the shelter are similar 
to that of the rigid frame shelter. Using the 16-
inch dimension of the block as a module, the 
resulting shelter interior size is 4 1 -0" high by 
5'-0" deep by 9'-8" long (see Figure 12). This 
will require six courses of block work, and, 
with the stressed-skin roof panel, will give a 
total height of approximately 5 1-0". This will 
leave about 2 '-0" of work space above the shelter 
even in a shallow basement. The concrete block 
wall depends upon the strength of the concrete 
mortar and the size and spacing of the reinforc-
ing bars to resist the blast loading. In this 
analysis, the wall was considered to span its 
full height and to be simply supported. The 
wall was then designed for an arching action 
failure at the mid-height mortar joint, which is 
analogous to plastic bending of masonry sections. 
Mortar strength of 2,000 PSI and steel strength 
of 40,000 PSI was assumed for the analysis. As 
in the other two shelters, a partial loading of 
10 PSI peak overpressure on the wall or 10 PSI 
peak overpressure on the roof element was 
considered, as well as a total load of 10 PSI 
peak overpressure on the entire structure. With 
the entire structure load at 1 0 PSI, the arching 
action of the plastic bending of the wall is in-
creased by the moment due to the eccentricity 
of the roof reaction on the deflected wall sections. 
The combined action of the blast loading on both 
wall and roof theoretically produce the critical 
design condition. The analysis indicated that a 
12-inch concrete block wall, with the voids 
filled with concrete mortar and one No. 4 rein-
forcing bar spaced 8 inches on center at the 
mid-point of the block, is needed to withstand 
the 10 PSI peak overpressures. Horizontal 
reinforcement in the block joints will also be 
necessary to distribute the load in a horizontal 
direction. 
To anchor the concrete wall to the basement 
floor, 1/2-inch round steel dowels are required 
8 inches on center to coincide with the rein-
forcing bars in the wall. 
The shear reaction from the upper half of 
the wall is transferred through the stressed-
skin roof panel in diaphragm action. The roof-
wall connection is designed to resist this lateral 
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REINFORCED CONCRETE BLOCK SHELTER 
Figure 12 
30 
load. As shown in Figure 13, the connection is 
somewhat different than the wall and floor 
connection shown for the lean-to and rigid-frame 
shelters. Instead of using the sheet metal 
connectors, the shear is transferred directly 
from the bearing plate into the lower skin of the 
roof panel. It uses 3/4-inch round bolts, anchored 
1" 0 bolt 16 " o.c. 
3x 12 plate--------
in the voids of the block and spaced 16 inches on 
center between each roof stringer, to transfer 
the wall shear to the 2 x 12 bearing plate. The 
lateral load is then transmitted through the roof 
panel to the basement wall. The roof panel is 
secured to the basement wall in the same manner 
as used for the rigid- frame shelter. 
sheet metal connector--~m.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
with 4 helically threaded -
nails on each side 
SECTION REINFORCED CONCRETE BLOCK SHELTER 
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The door of the shelter is located in the end 
or side wall. A double 2 x 10 member forms a 
jamb and provides a door opening 17 1/2" wide 
and 48" high. An inner and outer plywood door 
complete the end wall (see Figure 14). 
The materials needed to build the concrete 
block shelter are readily available. Concrete 
block, reinforcing bars, and pre-mixed cement 
mortar can be purchased at any material supply 
yard. 
The construction of the concrete block shelter 
may be somewhat beyond the capabilities of the 
average homeowner. The cost analysis shown 
in Chapter VI indicates an estimated cost if ma-
sonry labor must be purchased. This results in 
a small increase in the total cost of the shelter. 
The cone rete block shelter is constructed by 
first placing the No. 4 bars at 8" on center along 
the location of the walls. Since the wall is only 
4' -0" high, it is simpler to place the bars rather 
than use a combination of dowels and bars. If 
the shelter is being built in an existing basement, 
holes will have to be drilled into the floor slab 
at the dowel locations. Hooking the dowels will 
not be necessary since the withdrawal force is 
quite small. 
The concrete block walls are then construc-
ted by placing the cores of the block over the 
reinforcing bars. After three courses of block 
are placed, the voids in the block should be 
grouted with a concrete mixture using a very 
small aggregate. Care must be taken to be sure 
the reinforcing bars are positioned at exactly 
the mid-point of the block walls. After the top 
course of the block is grouted, the anchor bolts 
for the roof panel bearing plate are placed, to 
complete the block wall. The stressed-skin 
roof panels. which consist of 2 x 12 wood mem-
bers with 3/ 4-inch ply-
wood skins, can be fab-
ricated on the floor of 
the basement and then lift-
ed into place. After the 
sandbag fillers are placed 
between the 2 x 12 mem-
bers. the top plywood 
skin can be nail-glued 
into position. 
The double 2 x 12 
door jamb and header can 
be then cut to fit the open-
ing and secured to the con-
crete block and basement 
wall with heavy-duty ma-
sonry nails. The thresh-
old is secured to the floor 
by two bolts, located in 
holes drilled at the same 
time as the holes for the 
wall dowels are drilled. 
The hanging of the inner 
and outer plywood doors 
complete the shelter. 
Provisioning and ven-
tilation of the shelter is 
similar to that of the lean-
to and rigid-frame shelter. 
SIDEWALL ELEVATION OF CONCRETE BLOCK SHELTER 
Figure 14 
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V, CORE AND BUILDING BLOCK CONCEPT 
If the potential homebuyer could be presented 
with a house that incorporated a shelter area 
into the general living space of the house so 
that this space was useful for the every day 
needs of the family, then the probability of 
acceptance of home shelters might be greatly 
increased. 
A concept can be adopted that uses a hardened 
core of minimal size that will insure protection 
up to 10 PSI peak overpressures. Surrounding 
or adjacent to the core is an area that, although 
not necessarily suitable to provide protection 
from blast pressures of 10 PSI peak overpres-
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Figure 15 Six Person Blast Core 
sures can provide protection from the effects of 
fallout. This would, in effect. allow the occupants 
of the hardened core to move out into the larger 
area once the danger from blast pressures is 
past. This larger area must be designed as an 
integral part of the house, with little, if any, 
restriction on its use for everyday living func-
tions. A final step in the building-block concept 
would be to strengthen the balance of the house 
to resist pressures in the range of 5 PSI. This 
is a costly procedure, and would probably not 
be done by most homeowners. However, the 
"core and building-block" concept gives the 
homeowner the option of selecting the degree 
and number of habitability features he desires . 
Figure 16 Blast Core Variations 
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SECONDARY AREA 
Figure 17 Core and Secondary Areas 
To illustrate this concept, a number of 
architectural studies have been prepared, using 
typical "builder-oriented" designs as a base 
and then modifying the basic schemes. The use 
of this concept requires that the shelter areas 
given consideration during the design stages of 
the house. It is not a feature that can be easily 
added after the house is completed. The actual 
structural design or wall masses are not given 
in this discussion. since the studies are present-
ed as examples of what can be done architectur-
ally and not as finished designs. 
Since the blast-protected area will be the 
least useful as a general living area, it should 
be kept as compact as possible. It can still 
be used as a storage area, with properly designed 
shelving units; and will provide space for emer-
gency provisions and equipment necessary for 
occupying the hardened core area (Figure 15). 
Additional storage beyond the basic necessities 
could be located directly adjacent to the core 
and would be accessible to the occupants after 
the initial danger period is over. 
The present OCD recommendations for 
shelter space are ten square feet and sixty-five 
cubic feet per person. The study of the space 
needed by an adult (chapter IV) indicates that 
three feet by four feet is the minimum area 
that should be provided. This space need not be 
more than four feet high if provision for stand-
ing is not required. Space for six occupants 
can be arranged in a number of fasions . Some 
of the possible variations are shown in Figure 16. 
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Taking a six-person core arrangement, the 
secondary or fallout-only area can be added 
as shown in Figure 17. The secondary area 
shown in the illustration incorporates the water 
heater (as a possible water storage source), a 
bathroom (should community utility services 
be available), and a fireplace for heating and 
cooking use. 
The illustration indicates solid walls en-
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Figure 19 Baffles in Section 
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closing the secondary shelter area. This would 
be easy to provide in a basement situation. How-
ever, in an above-grade situation, the enclosing 
walls would not be acceptable. By the careful 
use of baffle walls, the same level of protection 
can be maintained and the resulting space can 
have some level of openness and be more accept-
able to the general public. Figures 18 and 19 
illustrate some of the ways that baffles can be 
used to provide the protection needed in the 
secondary shelter area. 
Figure 20 illustrates the inclusion of a core 
and shelter area in a basement application. No 
changes or special consideration was needed in 
planning the main floor except to locate the fire-
place so that it could be part of the shelter below. 
The stairway to the basement feeds into the 
family room, which has the normally expected 
windows. Adjacent to the family room is an 
area designated as a playroom , which is window-
less. Properly constructed, the playroom can 
provide a protection factor of 150. Although 
windowless, the playroom can maintain an open 
feeling by using a baffle wall between the play-
GARAGE 
FAMILY ROOM 
L.R. 
room and family room instead of closing it 
off with doors. 
Figure 21 illustrates the lower level of a 
tri-level house, which has been redesigned to 
provide a core and extended shelter area. The 
mid-level of the house and the garage wing pro-
vide protection on two sides of the shelter, and 
earth can be banked up against the third wall 
(Figure 22). Only one interior masonry wall 
and a baffle wall is needed to complete the 
shelter area. The secondary shelter area out-
side of the core could easily be used as a den, 
office, or study, with proper handling of artificial 
lighting, so that almost no space is lost for daily 
living use. It could not be counted as a possible 
bedroom since most building codes require that 
natural light and ventilation be provided. 
The use of a baffle wall at the foot of the 
stairs leading to the mid-level enables the shelter 
area to have some degree of openness while still 
maintaining a protection factor of 100. This 
scheme also allows for expansion into the family 
room area of the lower level as the intensity of 
DINE 
Figure 23 Above-Ground Shelter 
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Figure 24 Blast Protected House 
Figure 25 Blast Protected House-Section 
Figure 26 Blast Protected House-Exterior 
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the fallout decreases and/ or if the patio area 
outside the family room can be decontaminated 
by washing down. 
The arrangement discussed here presents an 
almost ideal solution, since it solves the problem 
of the area where deep basements are not pos-
sible because of water, rock, or other subsoil 
conditions while providing the core and shelter 
area with a minimum of rearrangement of the 
basic house scheme. 
There are areas of the country where, because 
of special founda 'ion conditions, any excavation 
below grade is impossible, so that even the 
minimum amount of excavation needed in the 
previous example is not feasible. In these areas, 
shelter must be provided above grade--a much 
more difficult and expensive problem to solve. 
Figure 23 illustrates one solution to the 
above ground shelter and core area that makes 
maximum use of the shelter area for everyday 
living requirements. The heavy fireplace wall 
and the masonry walls without openings adjacent 
to the area will give a protection factor of 100 
if a 10 1/2-inch concrete slab is provided 
overhead. 
By locating the core area close to the 
center of the house, advantage is taken of the 
geometric shielding offered by the rest of the 
house. Even if the rest of the house is destroyed 
by the blast pressures, the construction used in 
the core and shelter area will remain standing 
and provide shelter for the inhabitants. 
Figure 24 illustrates another technique for 
providing blast and fallout protection when 
excavation is impractical or impossible. The 
entire structure in this example is strengthened 
to resist overpressures up to 10 PSI. The 
house is planned around the core and shelter 
area. A circular plan is used so that the max-
imum amount of space can be enclosed using a 
minimum amount of perimeter wall. Mass 
shielding is provided by locating the core and 
shelter in the center of the house, by banking 
earth around half the house (see Figures 25 and 
26), and by placing heavy interior masonry walls 
so that they act as baffle walls for the shelter 
areas. The large glass areas of the dining, 
kitchen, and utility rooms face onto a paved 
court that can be decontaminated to reduce the 
radiation hazard. The interior family room and 
bedrooms receive natural light by using baffled 
clerestory windows and skylights. 
The arrangement in this scheme will provide 
a protection factor of 100 for the occupants of 
the shelter. 
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VI. WooD FRAME STRUCTURES 
It is possible that the homeowner may elect to 
provide additional strengthening in the frame of 
the house in addition to providing an austere 
shelter. as discussed in Chapter IV, or even if 
the more elaborate shelters as shown in Chapter 
V are used. The additional features may attempt 
to preserve all or part of the house. 
An analysis of a standard balloon-framed 
house structure indicates that the wall system 
is the weakest element of the structure. A wall 
framed with 2 x 4 studs at 16 inches on center, 
sheathed with 1/2-inch plywood, will resist a 
peak overpressure of 0.34 PSI. In contrast, the 
floor system will resist 3.46 PSI and the ceiling 
system 1.64 PSI when 2 x 10 floor joists and 
2 x 6 ceiling joists are used. If the wall sheath-
ing is glued to the studs instead of just nailed, 
the wall strength can be increased to resist 
1,6 PSI, which approaches a more 'balanced 
design. (The stud material would have to be 
stress-graded lumber to achieve this.) Anchor-
age to the foundation would require 1/2-inch 
bolts spaced 4 '-0" on center (see Figure 28). 
As an alternate to strengthening the wall 
system, the wall cladding can be designed to fail 
at very low pressures and a vented structure 
(as discussed in Chapter II) would result 
(Figure 27). This would sacrifice tl~e walls but 
would retain the value of the geometric shielding 
available from the roof structure up to blast 
pressures of 1.64 PSI. At that level, the roof 
would be lost, but protection up to 3.40 PSI would 
be available from the floor system. If the floor 
system is changed so that 2 x 12 joists are used 
in place of 2 x 10 members, the resistance will 
be increased to the 6.0 PSI level. If "select 
structural" lumber is used rather than "con-
struction grade", the floor could give protection 
up to 8 PSI. These minimum improvements to 
the strength of the house frame will probably 
add $1.00 to $1.20 per square foot to the cost of 
the house. 
If the homeowner desires to strengthen the 
entire house frame to resist 5 PSI, the details 
shown in Figure 29 can be followed. This would 
preserve the floor, walls, and ceiling systems, 
while sac;rificing the windows and roof system. 
The roof is allowed to "blow away" so that the 
ceiling has only to resist the peak overpressure 
and not the reflected overpressure. Continuity 
in the structure is achieved by using a modified 
balloon-frame system. Ceiling joists have been 
----'-------conventional frame to blow away 
~--2x10 header 
r----%" plywood 
----2x10 joist at 16" o.c. 
~---16- gauge sheet metal connector 
with 4 - 8d helically threaded nails 
2x6 plate 
"BLOW - AWAY" SUPERSTRUCTURE : 3.4 PSI 
Figure 27 
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_,"" -----_,....,...:."'::...._2x6 blow-away 
/ 
~....:.._, ___ 2- 2x4 plates 
,----1f2" plywood 
-2x6 joist lapped 
rafters 
with studs 
threaded nails 
blocking 
IN1-------t-------1f2" plywood glue-nailed 
--1------ 2x4 studs 16" o.c . 
.------blocking 
1f2" plywood 
2x10 joist lapped with studs 
3- 8d helically threaded nails 
_,__----16- gauge sheet metal connector 
with 3- 8d helically threaded nails 
2x6 plate 
MODIFIED BALLOON - FRAME: 1.6 PSI 
Figure 28 
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---__,.<"----/2x6 blow-away 
/ 
/ 
_,---L----2 - 2x6 plates 
,.-----'12" plywood 
o~+------blocking 
rafters 
---2x10 joist lapped with studs 
11'-------4- 8d helically threaded nails 
111a....:..._----%" plywood glue- nailed to studs 
- - lHI-- ---2x6 studs 12" o.c. 
r-----blocking 
.----%" plywood 
4- 8d helically threaded nails 
lapped with studs 
l l ll-:;;:;;.......,..;;;;::.r-.....,!I"T"~~r-- 2x6 plate 
~~~~:ll------10" x 3fa" continuous plate ( A- 36 steel ) 
with 8d helically threaded nails 4" o.c 
,~~--12"- 3000 psi concrete 
STRENGTHENED BALLOON - FRAME : 5 PSI 
Figure 29 
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increased to 2 x lO's and framed into the stud 
rather than over the stud as is done in conven-
tional framing. The anchorage to the concrete 
foundation requires a continuous 3/8-inch steel 
plate punched four inches on center so that the 
2 x 6 wood plate can be nailed to the steel plate. 
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The wall studs have been increased to 2 x 6 's, 
with 1/2-inch plywood nail-glued to both sides 
of the stud. These improvements to the house 
frame will add approximately $1.80 to $2.00 
per square foot to the cost of the house. 
VI I. CosT ANALYSIS 
The tables in this section summarize the mat-
erial cost for the three minimum shelters 
discussed in Chapter IV of this report. Since 
it is assumed that the shelter will be built by 
the homeowner, no attempt has been made to 
estimate the cost of labor, except that in the 
concrete block shelter an estimate of mason's 
labor has been made. 
Should the homeowner elect not to construct 
the shelter by himself, the cost of labor would 
vary considerably depending on geographic 
location and whether the shelter is part of the 
TABLE I 
original house construction or is added to an 
existing house. 
An estimate of the cost of providing the 
shelter shown in Chapter V is a much more 
difficult task. The shelter and expansion areas 
are an integral part of the house construction 
and it is difficult to differentiate between the 
"improvement" and the "conventional". An 
estimated cost of the hardened core is presented 
in Table V, including an estimated cost per 
square foot for the expansion area. 
ASSUMED MATERIAL COSTS 
ITEM 
Plywood-~-inch, fire-retardant treated 
Lumber, fire retardant 
Concrete block 
12-inch, grouted 
8-inch, grouted 
Reinforcing bars 
Sheet-metal connectors 
Special fasteners 
1!", 10 gauge 
2", 9 gauge 
Anchor bolts, ~" x 16" 
Hinges 
Latch 
Sand (in bags) 
Glue 
Concrete 
slabs 
walls 
UNIT 
sq. ft. 
1000 board feet 
each 
each 
ton 
each 
lb. 
lb . 
each 
pr. 
each 
cu. yd. 
lb . 
cu. yd. 
cu. yd. 
COST 
$ . 37 
$300.00 
$ .57 
$ .38 
$192.00 
$ .30 
$ .40 
$ .40 
$ .70 
$ 4.130 
$ 1. 00 
$ 14.00 
$ 1. 00 
$ 71 . 00 
$ 65 . 00 
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TABLE II 
LEA -TO SHELTER MATERIAL COST A1 ALYSIS 
ITEM UNIT QUANTITY u IT COST COST 
2!-inch plywood sq. ft. 233 $ . 37 $ 89.21 
2 x 12 lumber bd. ft. 358 $ .30 $107.40 
Sheet-metal connecbrs each 44 $ .30 $ 13.20 
Fasteners lb. 10 $ . 40 $ 4.00 
Anchor bolts each 20 $ .70 $ 14.00 
Hinges pr. 1 $ 4.60 $ 4.60 
Latch each 1 $ 1. 1)0 $ 1. 00 
Sand (in bags) cu. yds. 4 $14.00 $ 56.00 
Glue lb. 1 $ 1. 00 ~ 1. 00 
TOTAL MATERIAL: $290 . 41 
TABLE III 
RIGID-FRAME SHELTER COST ANALYSIS 
ITEM UNIT QUANTITY UNIT COST COST 
£-inch plywood sq. ft. 284 $ . 37 $105.08 
2 x 12 lumber bd. ft. 320 $ . 30 $ 96.00 
Sheet-metal connectors each 50 $ .30 $ 15.00 
Fasteners lb. 12 $ . 40 $ 4.80 
Anchor bolts each 24 $ .7 0 $ 16.80 
Hinges pr. 2 $ 4.60 $ 9.20 
Latch each 2 $ 1.00 $ 2.00 
Sand (in bags) cu. yd. 5.25 $14.00 $ 73.50 
Glue lb. 1 $ 1. 00 ~ 1. 00 
TOTAL MATERIAL: $323.38 
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TABLE IV 
CONCRETE BLOCK SHELTER COST ANALYSIS 
ITEM UNIT QUANTITY UNIT COST COST 
~ -inch plywood sq. ft. 160 $ .37 $ 59.20 
2 x 12 lumber bd. ft. 222 $ .30 $ 66.60 
Sheet-metal connectors each 16 $ .30 $ 4.80 
Fasteners lb. 7 $ .40 $ 2.80 
Anchor bolts each 16 $ .70 $ 11.20 
Concrete block 
12-inch each 66 $ .57 $ 37.62 
Reinforcing bars-#4 ton . 03 $192.00 $ 5.63 
Hinges pr. 1 $ 4.60 $ 4 .60 
Latch each 1 $ 1. 00 $ 1. 00 
Sand (in bags) cu. yd. 3 $ 14.00 $ 42.00 
TOTAL MATERIAL: $235.45 
Masonry labor (if neerled) 
12-inch block each 66 $ .77 $ 50.82 
TOTAL WITH PARTIAL LABOR: $286.27 
TABLE V 
CORE AND EXPANDED AREA 
CORE UNIT QUANTITY UNIT COST COST 
Walls: cu. yd. 12.5 $ 65 $ 809 
Roof: cu. yd. 3.7 $ 71 $ 263 
Door: each 2 $100 $ 200 
TOTAL- CORE: $1,272 
SECONDARY AREA 
Walls: cu. yd. 24.8 $ 65 $1,609 
Roof: cu. yd. 9.5 $ 71 ~ 673 
TOTAL: $2,282 
EXPANDED AREA 
Wall: sq. ft. $ 2.41 
Roof sq. ft. $ 2.19 
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